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Abstract—As an important example of the application of
blockchain technology, the Bitcoin network has achieved great
success. The network is secured by miners who are nowadays
organized in mining pools. In this paper, we consider the “block
withholding attack” as introduced by Eyal, where mining pools
may infiltrate others to decrease their revenues. However, when
two mining pools attack each other and neither controls a strict
majority, the so-called miner’s dilemma arises. Both pools are
worse off than without an attack. Knowing this, pools may make
implicit non-attack agreements. Having said this, the miner’s
dilemma is known to emerge only if no pool controls the majority
of the mining power. In this work, we extend the original model
to include miner migration and show that the miner’s dilemma
emerges even for pools whose mining power exceeds 50%. We
construct a game, where two mining pools attack each other
and use simulation analysis methods to analyze the evolution
the pools’ mining power, infiltration preferences and revenue
densities under the influence of different mining pool sizes and
miner migration preferences. The results show that underlying
game experiences a phase transition fueled by miners’ migration
preference. Without migration, it is profitable for a large mining
pool to attack the other pool. The higher the migration preference
of the miners, the more the game transitions into the miner’s
dilemma and attacking makes both pools worse off. Once the
pools violate their implicit non-attack agreements, their revenues
decrease.
Index Terms—bitcoin, miner’s dilemma; block withholding
attack; miner migration; evolutionary game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is still the most popular and most recognized cryp-
tocurrency so far with a market capitalisation of 308 billion
US dollar as of November 2020 [1]. Because of its novel
decentralized approach, Bitcoin has achieved great success
in the digital currency field [2, 3]. Within the underlying
blockchain network, nodes create blocks by solving by brute
force a computational problem. The nodes obtain a certain
amount of Bitcoin if they are able to create a valid block
[4]. The process of creating blocks is also called mining,
and the nodes participating in this process are called miners.
Due to the unstable mining profit of individual miners –
as the probability of mining a block is small for a single
miner – many miners tend to form mining pools to guarantee
stable profit through cooperative mining and profit-sharing [5].
However, in order to maximize their gains, mining pools can
let loyal miners infiltrate other mining pools to conduct a
pool block withholding attack [5]. The infiltrating miners do
not share valid block headers with the infiltrated mining pool
leading to a waste of resource for the other honest miners in
the pool. This reduces the revenue of the honest miners, but
also the profit of the infiltrating miner. This leads to a worse
Bitcoin mining environment and it is argued to seriously affect
the stability and security of the Bitcoin network [6].
Reference [7] shows that the block withholding attack
introduces a miner’s dilemma if neither pool controls a strict
majority of the mining power: in the Nash equilibrium, both
pools attack each other even though they would be better of by
not attacking. However, the author does not consider migra-
tion. One possible reaction of the honest miners in the attacked
mining pool may be to migrate to another pool to obtain
a greater profit. It is important to understand the infiltration
behavior of mining pools and the migration behavior of miners
within the Bitcoin network in combination. Revealing the
evolutionary mechanism of these behaviors helps to improve
the mining environment of Bitcoin, and promotes the stable
development of the Bitcoin network.
In the recent years, the process of Bitcoin mining has
attracted wide attention from the academic community. Some
scholars have conducted research on Bitcoin’s protocols, the
mining pool selection, attack methods, and reward mechanisms
[8, 9], [10, 11]. Others have also explored the impact of
transaction fees, of hash rates, of block propagation delays,
and of other factors on Bitcoin mining [12, 13, 14]. Early on
some people began to study the behavior of mining pools and
miners in Bitcoin from a game-theoretic perspective [14, 15].
Some scholars use evolutionary game theory to study the
security of Bitcoin mining by constructing a game model for
the process of Bitcoin mining [16, 17, 18]. Others have also
from the perspective of Nash equilibrium, put forward zero-
determinant strategy and deep gradient learning strategies to
optimize the process of mining strategy selection to solve
the mining dilemma [19, 20]. Within this context, the mining
process in Bitcoin under mutual attack between mining pools
has been studied. For example, [21] constructs an iterative
game model of miner mining under the mutual attack of two
mining pools, and proposes a zero-determinant strategy for
solving the dilemma of miners. Reference [22] built a game
model of mutual attacks between mining pools and found that
an increase of the attack costs and the basic migration rate of
miners can reduce the possibility of mutual attacks between
mining pools. Reference [23] built a game model of mutual978-1-6654-3924-4/21/$31.00 ©2021 IEEE
attacks under different mining pool sizes, studied the impact
of mining pool size on attack motivation, and found that
larger mining pools have greater attack motivation. Reference
[24] established a game model between mining pools based
on the PoW consensus algorithm, and found that the mining
pool can increase its infiltration rate and average income by
increasing the mining pool power and the betrayal rate of
miners. Reference [25] built a game model of mutual attacks
between mining pools and study the impact of different block
withholding (BWH) attack intensity on miners’ income. It is
found that only when the BWH attack intensity is lower than
a certain threshold, it can lead to an improvement of miners’
income in the mining pool, so as to attract more miners to
join the mining pool. In [26] the relationship between miner
migration and mining pool rewards is studied, and it is found
that it is almost impossible to distribute rewards in a stable
way, and some miners always migrate between mining pools.
Reference [27] empirically analyzed the migration behavior of
miners among 15 mining pools in the history of Bitcoin and
found that miners are a typical economic entity seeking to
maximize profits. With respect to the migration process, [28]
considers the relationship between the random migration level
of miners and the average earnings of miners, and constructs
a concurrent mean return game model (CMPG) to analyze the
motivation to deviate from honest behavior. [29] found that
changes in the profit of neighboring mining pools will lead
to changes in the attractiveness of the pool and may lead to
random migration of miners between the pools.
The previous game-theoretic research on mutual attacks of
mining pools has been very fruitful. However, the above work
still has the following two main deficiencies: (1) Most scholars
have only analyzed the impact of either the mining pool or the
miners’ behavior on average earnings, ignoring the interaction
between mining pools and miners. (2) The withholding attack
has only been explored without migrating miners.
In view of this, we consider the game model of [7] on
mutual attacks of mining pools and extend it to account for
migration of miners. This allows us to explore the interaction
between mining pools and miners. We construct a game model
based on evolutionary game theory, where mining pools select
the optimal infiltration rate and miners can migrate. We use
a simulation to analyze the evolution of the mining pool’s
mining power, infiltration preferences and revenue densities
(i.e. average earnings) under the influence of different mining
pool sizes and miner migration preferences. We show that
the miner’s dilemma introduced by [7] for pools with mining
power of less than 50% emerges also for pools controlling a
strict majority of the mining power once migration is taken
into account. Furthermore, a phase transition takes place once
migration is introduced. The miner’s dilemma does not emerge
without migration and the stronger the migration preference
become, the more the game changes into an iterative prisoner’s
dilemma that is played by the mining pools. Reference [7]
suggests that the block withholding attack does rarely occur
in the bitcoin network since the pools know that they would
end up in this sub-optimal situation. Knowing this fact, pools
may have reached implicit agreements to not attack each other.
We provide further indication that this holds true even if
one pool dominates the mining power – given that miners
migrate. According to the argument of [7], this non-attack
situation is unstable and eventually, one pool will decide to
attack as this can be done anonymously. As a consequence,
miners will form smaller private pools which leads to more
fine-grained mining power distribution and a potentially better
situation for the Bitcoin mining environment (in terms of
reduced concentrations). Whether this mechanism really takes
place in practice is questionable, as we atomization of mining
pools is not observed. We argue that even though the miner’s
dilemma emerges also in a network with highly concentrated
mining power distribution, it does not induce the aforemen-
tioned mechanisms and positive impacts on the Bitcoin mining
environment.
Our contributions are therefore:
1) Extending the game model of [7] with migration.
2) Modeling the interaction between mining pools and min-
ers with respect to the block withholding attack.
3) Showing that the miner’s dilemma emerges also for pools
controlling a strict majority of the mining power.
4) Exploring the phase transition of the game based on the
migration preference of the miners.
5) Providing further reasoning for implicit non-attack agree-
ments among mining pools - even if one pool dominates
the network.
6) Discussing further the implications of the miner’s
dilemma on the mining environment of Bitcoin.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
foundations of the evolutionary analysis framework of the
two mining pool game in the Bitcoin network is presented
in section II. Then, the game model of the two mining pools
game in the Bitcoin network is introduced in section III.
Subsequently, the simulation results of two mining pools under
mutual attack are illustrated in section IV. Finally, Section V
concludes.
II. MODEL FOUNDATIONS
With the increasing value of Bitcoin, mining has become a
fast-growing industry [30]. But in the mining process, only the
most advanced mining equipment produces profit, otherwise,
the cost exceeds expected profit. If we consider a node with
a small computing power with respect to the whole network,
the probability it mines a block is low. Thus, most of the
miners usually organize themselves into mining pools to obtain
a more stable profit [7]. Mining pools are ad hoc groups
of many miners who share computational resources to mine
blocks together. When a miner in the mining pool succeeds
in mining, the revenue is distributed among the mining pool
members according to their mining capacity. Due to the
combined computational power, mining pools can find blocks
at a higher rate, which makes the mining pool obtain more
frequent revenue, thereby ensuring that the miners can obtain
a more stable profit.
Fig. 1: Evolutionary analysis framework (extended version of [7])
In the process of Bitcoin mining, some mining pools
adopted pool block withholding attacks to maximize their own
profits [5]. The attacking miners register with the infiltrated
mining pool and start mining, but the attacking miners only
send a part of their proof of work. If the attacking miners
find a solution that constitutes a complete proof of work, they
discard it, so that the total revenue of the attacked mining pool
is reduced. This decreases the revenue of the attacking miners
and, therefore, this attack can only be used for sabotage.
If the attacked mining pool is in such an environment for
a long time, its members, under the dual influence of their
own profits and the profits of neighboring mining pool miners,
might choose a migration strategy, which ultimately makes the
attacked mining pool paralyzed and it may collapse because
it cannot maintain the normal operation of a mining pool. On
the long-term, this will lead to the gradual deterioration of the
mining environment and the emergence of oligopoly mining
pools. However, the attacked pool may choose to defend itself
by infiltrating the other pool as well.
Based on this, we build an evolutionary analysis framework
for the two mining pools game under the Bitcoin network.
We embed the pools’ attack behavior and miner’s migration
behavior into the game model of the two mining pools, thereby
extending the model of [7]. The total mining power in the
network is m, where the mining pool power in mining pool
1 is m1 > 0, the mining pool power in mining pool 2 is
m2 > 0 and we have m = m1+m2. Mining pool i controls the
infiltration of mining pool j to xi→j . We denote the migration
preference of the pools by α. When a miner migrates, a miner
will take a share α of its mining capacity away from the mining
pool and transfer it to the other mining pool. As shown in
Figure 1, we can explore the evolution of the pool’s mining
power, infiltration preference and revenue density by varying
the pool sizes and the miner migration preferences.
III. GAME MODEL
A. Basic Assumptions of the Model
To study the effects of migration on the miners’ rewards,
we keep the model as parsimonious as possible. In particular,
we consider only two large mining pools as this suffices to un-
derstand the basic mechanics of the block withholding attack
with migration. Therefore, based on the characteristics of the
game between the mining pools and practical considerations,
we make the following assumptions
i.) In the Bitcoin network, there are only two large mining
pools and all miners depend on the mining pool to obtain
revenue.
ii.) All miners have the same individual mining capacity
(they are identical).
iii.) Pools and miners maximize profits.
iv.) Pools can select their infiltration preference.
v.) Miners in the mining pool are bounded rational agents,
and can only choose between two strategies: migration
and non-migration. When a miner migrates, a miner will
take a share α of its mining capacity away from the
mining pool and transfer it to the other mining pool.
vi.) Miners use a unified strategy update rule of memory
length 1, that is, the miner’s strategy selection depends
on the result of the previous round.
B. Construction of The Game Model
We draw on [7] to construct the game model presented by
Equations (2) - (8). During the first round (t = 1) game, the
total mining power is m, with m = m1 +m2. The effective
mining power of mining pool 1 is m1 − x1→2. Likewise, the
effective mining power of mining pool 2 is m2 − x2→1. The
total effective mining power in the Bitcoin network is therefore
m−x1→2−x2→1. The direct revenue share R1 of mining pool
1 and R2 of mining pool 2 are their effective mining rates.
That is the mining power excluding the infiltration, divided by
the total effective mining power:
R1 =
m1 − x1→2




m− x1→2 − x2→1
(2)
The sum of the direct revenue shares always equals 1, i.e.
this reflects the distribution of the fixed block reward between
the mining pools. However, during each round of the game,
there are two sources of revenue for the mining pool. One part
is the direct mining revenue brought by the faithful miners’
honest mining, and the other part is the indirect revenue of the
infiltration miners attacking the neighboring mining pool, that
is, the total revenue of the attacked mining pool multiplied
by its infiltration rate. At the same time, the mining pool
distributes the total revenue to its registered miners. Therefore,
the revenue of each miner in mining pool 1 (denoted by r1)









Therefore, the revenue density measures the total revenue of
honest mining and of attacking the neighboring pool, while the
latter revenue is not a monetary reward, but rather the indirect
gain of reducing the nominal mining power of the other pool.
While the direct profits Ri always add up to 1 – the reward
is fixed in the system –, the revenue densities are not a zero-
sum game, since the revenue densities expresses the relative
advantages with respect to the mining pools’ revenues.
Solving for r1 and r2, we express the revenue density as a
function of x1→2 and x2→1:
r1(x1→2, x2→1) =




m1R2 + x2→1(R1 +R2)
m1m2 +m1x1→2 +m2x2→1
(6)
C. The Optimal Infiltration Rate
Each mining pool selects the infiltration rate in order to
obtain the maximum profit r for its miners. Therefore, in each
round t, the mining pools calculate the best infiltration rate








′, x1→2(t− 1)) (8)
As shown by [7], for any pool size m1 and m2 (0 < m1,
0 < m2, m1+m2 ≤ m), a unique solution exists. In particular,
for our model with m1 +m2 = m, the solution exists and is
unique.
D. The Migration Rule
If the honest miners in pool i migrate a share α in time t to
pool j, then the mining power of pool j increases accordingly
in the next period. We model therefore the migration dynamics
as:
mj(t+ 1) = mj(t) + α× [mi(t)− xi→j(t)] (9)
The honest miners compare their profits in pool i to the
profits of the miners in the neighbouring pool j, and migrate
a share α of their mining power with a probability Wi in the
next round of the game. We use the Fermi update rule [31]
as it is standard for bounded rational agents and construct the










where K represents the noise intensity, that is, the inter-
ference caused by external factors on the strategy learning
process. When K → 0 , it means that external factors will not
interfere with the miner’s strategy learning. When K diverges,
it means that the miner can only update its strategy randomly
due to interference from external factors.
IV. SIMULATION ANALYSIS
A. Simulation Setting
According to the introduced evolutionary model, simulation
steps under the mutual attack of the two mining pools are set
as follows:
1) Initialize the parameters of the simulation.
2) In time step t of the game, the miners compare their pre-
vious profits with the miners of the neighboring mining
pool and decide whether to migrate a share α.
3) The mining pools decide on their infiltration rate x(t)
based on the previous profits.
4) At the end of time step t, calculate the new profits.
5) At the beginning of t+1, repeat Step 2 and Step 3 until
reaching the the final time step T , and the simulation is
stopped.
At the start of the simulation (t = 0), we set the total
mining power m = 1 and we select a noise factor K = 0.5
as it is often done in literature. We conduct the simulation for
different values of m1,m2, and α. We run the simulation for
all size combinations of m1 and m2, where m1 = 1 − m2.
Further, we analyse three different scenarios: 1) no migration
(α = 0), 2) moderate migration (α = 0.1), and 3) strong
migration (α = 0.2). We use Matlab2020a to conduct the
simulation analysis. We simulate the game for T = 500 time
steps. To ensure the accuracy of the results, we average the
results over 100 runs for each parameter setting.
B. The Mining Power
In the model, the mining power m2 can be expressed as
1 −m1. As a consequence, one mining pool always controls
a strict majority of the mining power. In Subfigure 2a, only
(a) Only pool 1 attacks: The changes of
the mining power with respect to the initial
mining power m1 and three different migra-
tion preferences α of the miners.
(b) Both pools attack: The changes of the
mining power with respect to the initial min-
ing power m1 and three different migration
preferences α of the miners.
(c) Only pool 1 attacks: The changes of
the infiltration preference with respect to the
initial mining power m1 and three different
migration preferences α of the miners.
(d) Both pools attack: The changes of the
infiltration preference with respect to the
initial mining power m1 and three different
migration preferences α of the miners.
(e) Only pool 1 attacks: The changes
of the revenue density with respect to the
initial mining power m1 and three different
migration preferences α of the miners.
(f) Both pools attack: The changes of the
revenue density with respect to the initial
mining power m1 and three different mi-
gration preferences α of the miners.
Fig. 2: The mining power, the infiltration preference and the revenue density of the two pools for three different α and varying
m.
pool 1 attacks, i.e. x2→1 = 0. In this case, it does not
matter whether the miner has a moderate (α = 0.1) or a
strong (α = 0.2) preference for migration. We will see this
invariance in all of the subsequent analysis for the one-pool-
attacks scenario. Interestingly here, even an initially small pool
is able to gain a strict majority of the mining power in the
long run. This is not true for the both-pools-attack scenario
shown in Subfigure 2b. In all three migration scenarios, the
pool initially controlling the majority of the mining power still
controls the majority at the end. With α = 0, we recover the
model of [7] as no migration takes place. In this case, there
is no dynamic evolution of the mining power over time and
the mining powers remain constant. However, in presence of
moderate migration (α = 0.1), the behavior changes. There are
two regimes: in the first, when m1 ∈ (0.0, 0.3)∪(0.7, 1.0), the
mining powers gravitate towards a high (90%) resp. low (10%)
level irrespective of the initial mining power. At a certain
critical point (m1 ≈ 0.3), the second regime begins and the
mining power increases (resp. decreases) rapidly. Furthermore,
the larger pool tend to profit from moderate migration as they
are able to gain mining power over time. Only very large pools
with a mining power m > 0.9 lose some miners to the smaller
one. If migration preference is higher (α = 0.2), however, the
largest pool is worse off than without migration. Similarly, we
observe again two regimes: In the first, miners migrate to the
other pool leading to lower discrepancy between the mining
powers; in the second, miners’ migration cancels out and the
initial mining powers remain more or less constant. Therefore,
small pools tend to gain mining power, whereas large pools
tend to lose miners.
C. The Optimal Infiltration Rate
As [7] already noted, there is a certain threshold for the size
of a mining pool that is needed such that an infiltration attack
is considered worthwhile. In the one-pool-attacks scenario
(Subfigure 2c), the pool that has the possibility to attack will
always choose to do so (as m ≈ 0.9, see Subfigure 2a). As
before, the magnitude of the miners’ migration preference does
not matter. As shown in Subfigure 2d, with no migration, the
pools do not attack if m < 0.2. However, with migration, there
are at least some small attacks for moderate migration and
larger attacks for strong migration. Since the size of the mining
pools is not static anymore and changes during the simulation,
the infiltration preferences change respectively. In the case
of moderate migration, the logic of [7] is recovered. Since
in the first regime (m1 ∈ (0.0, 0.3) ∪ (0.7, 1.0)), the mining
power of the smaller pool stabilizes around 0.1, the infiltration
preference is the same as with no migration at m1 = 0.1
resp. m1 = 0.9, i.e. represented by the intersection of the
lines with no migration and moderate migration in Figure
2d. Once the migration preference of the miners becomes
stronger, the infiltration once again assimilates and both pools
will always attack. Initially small mining pools consider an
attack worthwhile as well, since they are able to reach a
considerable size. The whole dynamics is an iterative adaption
process between the mining pools and the miners: at time t, the
miners decide to migrate and the mining pool sets the optimal
infiltration rate. Their decisions are based on the decisions of
each other (as well as on the other mining pool and its miners)
at time t− 1.
D. The Emergence of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
If none of the pools attacks, the revenue density is for both
pools equal to one if the total mining power is m = 1. To see
this, consider equation (3) and (4) with x1→2 = x2→1 = 0 and
m = 1. Reference [7] has showed that a prisoner’s dilemma
exists when neither mining pool controls the majority of the
mining power. Concretely, he shows that when two pools with
m1 < 0.5 and m2 < 0.5 attack each other, both obtain a
revenue density r < 1, but attacking is still their best strategy.
However, this is only valid under the condition that none
of the pools controls a strict majority of the mining power.
In our model, one of the pools always (except in the edge
case of m1 = 0.5) controls a strict majority. In this scenario,
[7] shows that the pool controlling the majority can always
improve its revenue compared to the no-pool-attacks scenario.
To see this, consider Figure 2 in the no migration case (α = 0).
Subfigure 2e shows the one-pool-attacks scenario if pool 1
attacks, however, due to symmetry, the results hold true for
pool 2 as well. The attacking pool can earn a revenue larger
than its fair share irrespective of its initial size m, whereas the
attacked pool earns a revenue lower than one. If both pools
attack (Subfigure 2f), the larger mining pool (m > 0.5) always
earns a revenue bigger than one in the no migration case and
the smaller pools earns less than one. Therefore, attacking is
a dominant strategy for the larger pool as its revenue is larger
than one. This can be modelled as a game and is shown in table
I, where we denote the revenue of the smaller pool with rs and
the revenue of the larger pool with rl. For the smaller pool,
it depends on the initial mining power ms whether to attack.
However, without migration attacking is clearly a dominant




no attack 1, 1 rs < 1, rl > 1
attack rs > 1, rl < 1 rs < 1, rl > 1
TABLE I: Dominant strategy game without migration (α = 0).
If there is strong migration (α = 0.2), the game has
changed. In the one-pool-attacks scenario, the revenue of the
attacked pool is below 0.4 no matter what is its initial size m.
Furthermore, in the two-pools-attack scenario, the revenues for
the larger pools are below one and the revenues for smaller
pools larger than 0.4. The exact values depend on the initial
sizes m, but it is clear that the revenue densities are below
one. As a result, we recover the miner’s dilemma of [7]. Table
II shows the payoff matrix for the miners. Here, it becomes
clear that with strong migration, we end up with the both-
pools-attack Nash equilibrium. Even though both pools would
be better off by not attacking each other, they both attack,




no attack 1, 1 rs ≪ 1, rl > 1
attack rs > 1, rl ≪ 1 rs < 1, rl < 1
TABLE II: Miner’s dilemma for strong migration (α = 0.2).
Interestingly, taking migration into account leads once again
to the prisoner’s dilemma also when one pool controls a
strict majority. However, the effect depends on the migration
intensity. The case of moderate migration (α = 0.1) is
mixture between the dominant-strategy game (α = 0) and the
prisoner’s dilemma (α = 0.2) depending on the exact value
of m1. Therefore, the game goes through a phase transition
depending on the migration parameter α.
E. The Strength of Migration
In Figure 3, we show the effect of varying the miner’s
migration preference α. For large differences in the initial
mining power (m1 = 0.05), the larger pool loses mining
power with migration for all value of α. However, the larger
mining pool is able to retain about 90% of the mining power
even for moderate migration (α = 0.1). After this, the
differences in mining power decline rapidly and at a value
of α ≈ 0.35 it vanishes. With such strong migration, the
initial large difference in mining power does not play a role
anymore as migration leads to an assimilation of both pools.
This observation holds true for other initial configurations if
the migration is that strong (α ≥ 0.35). For lower values of
migration preference, however, the pool that has a larger initial
mining power is able to gain mining power over time.
The optimal infiltration preference in Sub-figure 3b chosen
by the mining also varies with the parameter α. If the mi-
gration preference of the miners becomes stronger (α > 0.1),
the small pool starts to attack. The optimal infiltration rate
x depends also on the eventual size of the mining pool.
Therefore, the infiltration rate assimilates and stabilizes at a
value of 0.25.
With respect to the the revenue density, we can observe
that the emergence of the miner’s dilemma depends on α,
but also on the initial mining power m of the pools. If the
initial mining powers of the pools are very similar, the miner’s
dilemma emerges even for small value of α. In other words, the
game transitions already with little migration into the miner’s
dilemma. When one pool controls a large majority of the initial
(a) Both pools attacks: The changes of the
mining power with respect to the migration
preference α and three different initial min-
ing powers m of the miners.
(b) Both pools attack: The changes of the
infiltration preference with respect to the
migration preference α and three different
initial mining powers m of the miners.
(c) Both pools attack: The changes of the
revenue density with respect to the migra-
tion preference α and three different initial
mining powers m of the miners.
Fig. 3: The average mining power, infiltration preference, and revenue density for three different m and varying α.
mining power (e.g. 90%), then it requires strong migration
such that the miner’s dilemma emerges.
V. CONCLUSION
Considering the migration process of miners in a proof
of work system, we extend the model of Eyal to study the
mutual infiltration attack between two mining pools if one
pool controls a strict majority of the mining power. We show
that the miner’s dilemma emerges for all initial pool sizes
if the migration is strong enough. After a certain migration
preference of the miners has been surpassed, even extremely
large pools suffer from the miner’s dilemma. This result may
help to explain why the block withholding attack has been
rarely observed in Bitcoin. Even though a few mining pools are
jointly controlling the majority of the mining power in Bitcoin,
block withholding attacks do not occur. Our results show that
with migration, also large pools must fear the miner’s dilemma
and it is therefore probable that implicit non-attack agreements
exist. However if the sole mechanism would be the miner’s
dilemma, ultimately one pool would attack as this situation
is unstable. Consequently, the other pool would also attack
leading to lower revenues for both pools and miners would
leave the mining pools to form smaller (private) pools leading
to an improved mining environment.
Our work here suffers from certain limitations: We applied
a relatively straightforward migration model which might
not adequately captures the migration dynamics. Further, we
neglected pool fees in our analysis. We also made some
simplifying assumptions such that all miners have the same
mining power. Lastly, we only looked at a two pool setting.
For future work, we plan to extend on our work as follows:
We want to include several pools as well as multiple distinct
miners. We also want to explore other migration dynamics to
check the robustness of our results. Additionally, we want to
conduct an in-depth evaluation of our theoretical results with
data from the real Bitcoin network. Finally, we will explore
why the block withholding attack does not occur in practice,
since there are other mechanisms than the miner’s dilemma
at play as well. All in all, we hope to contribute to a better
understanding of the mining environment in proof of work
blockchain-based systems.
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